One problem of memory seldom acknowledged is that it takes time (Huk and Shadlen 2005; Sipser 2012) . It takes time to think, it takes time to recall. It certainly takes time to consider different options and construct (or favour) a chain of events out of web of possibilities (Chapman 1987 People are often shocked or frustrated by their own poor memories. One of the reasons for this is that our memories have not only a directly functional role, but also a more complicated meta-narrative role. Our memories are part of our identity. And while we might recognise that others behave inconsistently or seem to have contradictory goals or motives, we seldom see this in ourselves. One reason for this is because we in fact have several selves (a theory called constructivism; for a recent discussion see Lebow 2012). In particular contexts we have particular goals and beliefs. For example, when walking we may be annoyed by drivers, and while driving be annoyed by pedestrians. Thinkers from Hume (1739) to Minsky (1988) have speculated that a coherent self is an illusion, constructed for some form of convenience: 'we may observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity'.
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Perhaps that convenience is planning the future-it's easier if at any one point you assume your goals are consistent.
I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures.
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Or perhaps the narrative of self is something that has evolved culturally because it promotes society-it is easier to maintain social order if people are responsible for their past actions, which after all they are likely to repeat in similar circumstances (Graziano 2014).
The self cannot be considered entirely an illusion. An individual has (ordinarily) one set of human DNA, one set of biological parents, one educational and one criminal history. An individual is more or less fixed in their adult height and a number of their acuities. Nevertheless, much of the self-the stories we tell, the people we love, our homes and other possessions, our friends, our goals, our needs, even our names-much of this changes over time. There is great convenience not just for others but for the self in being able to confabulate a version of the self to benefit the reasoning of that self (and others) about itself. Now as we come to understand our selves better, we might hope to become better at reasoning about our other selves as well-the pasts we can't remember, the people we appear to be to others, the people we might become in the wrong or right circumstances. We might hope that this insight will improve our empathy and our judgement. But what if our ignorance is not the result of unfortunate chance biological limits, but rather reflects a set of optima, carefully honed by evolution, suited to the dynamics of our social situations and our mental well being? Our new reality of big data providing records of our every move, and of ever-improving scientific (or artificial intelligence) models for predicting and understanding our behaviour, make many fearful because of the loss of privacy from others (Bryson 2015) . We fear exploitation by advertisers who might exploit our weaknesses, governments that might find ways to disenfranchise us, bullies and assailants that might manipulate or abuse us. But what about our privacy from reality, and from our selves? Are there limits to the extent to which a life should be self examined? Science tells us that optimism rather than realism is key to our mental well being (Taylor and Brown 1988) , but also that our individual levels of optimism and pessimism are highly influenced by both our genes and our upbringing (Plomin et al. 1992 ). We will almost certainly experience the answer to this question in the near future, but whether we will accurately recall our lives in the past and know what we have gained or lost-that is less certain. More likely, our newly-confabulated selves will conform to the new norms of society and recall a skewed perspective on our current present, our future past.
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